Personal Account: Inside Stories of Thai-Myanmar Relations

In December 1988, hundreds of imprisoned Thai fishermen from various prisons across Myanmar were gathered and brought to the Inya Lake Hotel. I was right there at the Inya Lake Hotel along with them. From there, they were sent back to Thailand via a special Thai Airways (TG) flight.

The reason for their release and repatriation was a quid pro quo arrangement: in exchange, the Myanmar military was permitted to launch attacks from Thai territory during the Battle of Mae Sam Laut.

Ever since the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) era, Thailand maintained a policy of avoiding direct military clashes with the Myanmar military. To achieve this, Bangkok supported proxy Karen armed groups. On one hand, they extracted teak logs from territories controlled by these Karen armed groups. On the other hand, taking advantage of Myanmar's weak naval control, armed pirate boat syndicates based in Ranong and Mahachai extensively plundered Myanmar's marine resources, stealing massive amounts of fish and prawns.

Simultaneously, there was a thriving smuggling route running from Myawaddy, Kawkareik, and Mawlamyine, funneling Thai goods into Myanmar. At that time, 80% of all consumer goods in Myanmar were Thai products—long before China's Ruili became developed.

Consequently, periods of political turmoil and hardship in Myanmar—encapsulated by the mindset of "Myanmar's difficulty is Thailand's opportunity"—consistently worked to enrich Thailand.

Later, as Myanmar remained incapable of securing its maritime boundaries, the authorities adopted a system of issuing official licenses to Thai fishing enterprises to generate revenue. To monitor pirate boats and gather intelligence, communication systems were installed and issued on Myanmar fishing vessels.

To maximize border trade profits—such as conducting intelligence operations through naval bases in Kawthaung and Myeik, and establishing formal tax-generating border trade systems by making peace with armed groups—the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) was splintered off from the KNU. These maneuvers generated substantial revenues for both the SLORC regime and the Thai government.

With this background, I believe readers can easily deduce and analyze the current situation.

Today, efforts are underway to reopen the Myitkyina and Muse-Mandalay trade routes backed by China, reduce the number of checkpoints, and share profits with the MNDAA. While the MNDAA has expanded its controlled territories and dismantled checkpoints along the route upon China's directive, the military junta still needs to remove a few remaining security checkpoints justified under Mandalay's security.

Regarding the Thai-Myanmar trade corridor, efforts are being pushed to operate regular international shipping lines, the Ranong-Kawthaung maritime trade route, and to reopen the Myawaddy-Mawlamyine route.

The Tamu route appears unlikely to be resolved anytime soon due to the active involvement of the AA (Arakan Army).

Once these trade routes are fully reopened, Myanmar will be able to sustain itself without fearing any international economic sanctions. Furthermore, a non-dollar trade settlement system between China, Thailand, and Myanmar—whose foundations were already laid three years ago—will only need to be put into action.