Executive Summary
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of recent allegations concerning military support from Bangladesh and the United States to the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar, alongside an assessment of broader US government and intelligence involvement in the region. The findings address the core components of the inquiry, drawing on available research to delineate facts from unsubstantiated claims.
Regarding alleged Bangladesh military support for the Arakan Army (AA), the evidence indicates no direct military backing. Bangladesh's engagement with both the Myanmar junta and the AA is primarily diplomatic and humanitarian, driven by the pressing need to manage the Rohingya crisis and ensure border stability. This engagement, while sometimes unofficial with the AA due to their de facto control over significant portions of Rakhine State, is rooted in pragmatic necessity rather than military alignment.
Concerning alleged US military support for the Arakan Army (AA), there is no credible evidence of direct military aid. US policy towards Myanmar focuses on imposing sanctions against the military junta, providing authorized non-lethal assistance to broader resistance groups (though implementation has faced delays), and promoting democracy and human rights. Claims of a US "proxy war" in Myanmar, including direct military support to the AA, are widely dismissed by expert observers as lacking verifiable evidence.
As for current US government or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in Myanmar affairs, beyond overt diplomatic engagement, sanctions, and humanitarian aid, there are no current indications of direct, overt CIA operational involvement or military support for specific resistance groups, including the AA, post-2021 coup. While historical CIA activities in Myanmar are documented, these do not suggest a current direct operational role in the ongoing conflict. US intelligence maintains an interest in the region, particularly concerning regional stability and countering Chinese influence, but without evidence of direct military intervention or covert action in support of the AA.
The broader geopolitical context reveals Myanmar's conflict, especially in Rakhine State, as a complex arena where regional powers like China and India actively pursue their strategic interests. This often involves dual-track diplomacy or engagement with various actors, including the AA, which complicates prospects for a stable resolution and contributes to a conflict-fueled shadow economy.
Introduction: The Evolving Conflict in Myanmar and Rakhine State
Myanmar has been engulfed in a profound "polycrisis" since the military coup in February 2021, leading to widespread conflict and significant instability across the nation. The military junta, officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has seen its territorial control severely diminish, reportedly holding only about 21% of Myanmar's landmass. In contrast, various resistance groups now control 42%, with the remaining territory heavily contested. This dramatic shift in control underscores the profound weakening of the central military authority and the fragmentation of governance across the country.
Within this tumultuous environment, the Arakan Army (AA), the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), has emerged as a dominant non-state actor in Rakhine State. The AA has strategically capitalized on the instability, asserting de facto control over approximately 80% of the region that shares a border with Bangladesh. Since launching a significant offensive in November 2023, the AA has achieved substantial territorial gains, capturing strategic towns and key positions along the Bangladesh-Myanmar frontier. The stated objective of the AA is to achieve greater autonomy for the Rakhine people, a goal they have pursued through sustained military campaigns against the junta.
The ongoing conflict in Rakhine has severely exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis, leading to massive internal displacement and a continuous flow of refugees into neighboring countries. Bangladesh, in particular, bears a heavy burden, hosting over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees, with an additional 113,000 having fled into its territory since November 2023 alone. This influx places immense pressure on Bangladesh's already strained resources and social cohesion, creating a complex humanitarian and security dilemma for Dhaka.
Adding to the crisis, the Myanmar junta has been accused of systematically denying life-saving humanitarian aid to affected civilians, including both Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities. This deliberate obstruction extends to blocking trade routes and refusing travel authorizations for humanitarian workers and essential medicine shipments. Such actions are not merely consequences of the conflict but appear to be a calculated strategy by the junta to exert control over populations and weaken support for resistance groups, potentially amounting to war crimes. This transforms humanitarian assistance from a neutral act of relief into a contested element of warfare, creating profound ethical dilemmas for aid organizations and international actors.
Efforts towards Rohingya repatriation, a long-standing international objective, are severely complicated by the persistent conflict and the AA's extensive control over Rakhine. Despite Myanmar's announcement of verifying 180,000 Rohingya as "eligible" for repatriation, widespread skepticism persists due to the unstable conditions and the AA's dominant presence in the proposed return areas. Any sustainable resolution for the Rohingya crisis will increasingly depend on direct and effective engagement with the AA, given their consolidation of power. This shift towards de facto governance by the AA fundamentally alters the regional diplomatic and humanitarian landscape. It compels neighboring states like Bangladesh and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to engage with the AA as a necessary interlocutor for humanitarian aid delivery, border management, and any future repatriation efforts. This pragmatic engagement, even if unofficial, inadvertently confers a degree of legitimacy upon the AA's authority, challenging traditional state-centric approaches to international relations and complicating the junta's claims of sovereignty over Rakhine.
Assessment of Alleged Bangladesh Military Support for the Arakan Army
Bangladesh's approach to the escalating conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State is characterized by a complex balancing act, prioritizing border stability, humanitarian concerns, and the eventual repatriation of Rohingya refugees. Official statements and diplomatic engagements reveal a nuanced strategy rather than direct military support for any armed group.
Bangladesh maintains active diplomatic contact with both the Myanmar junta in Naypyidaw and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. This dual engagement reflects Bangladesh's precarious position as a direct neighbor grappling with the severe spillover effects of Myanmar's internal conflict. The primary stated objectives of these engagements are explicitly focused on "stability, humanitarian aid, and Rohingya repatriation". Bangladesh's National Security Adviser, Khalilur Rahman, affirmed direct engagement with Naypyidaw and engagement with the Arakan Army "via the UN," indicating a preference for internationally mediated channels when dealing with non-state actors like the AA.
Bangladesh has, in principle, agreed to a United Nations proposal for a humanitarian passage into Rakhine State, to be supervised by the UN, but with "certain conditions" attached. This cautious acceptance underscores Bangladesh's desire to facilitate aid while mitigating potential risks to its national security and sovereignty. A UN spokesperson further clarified that any cross-border humanitarian support from Bangladesh to Myanmar would require agreement between the two governments, as the UN is legally obligated to obtain permission from concerned governments for such assistance. This highlights the formal diplomatic hurdles involved, even for humanitarian initiatives, and the necessity of state-level consent.
The concept of a "humanitarian corridor" has generated significant domestic political debate and concern within Bangladesh. Political parties, such as the BNP, have voiced strong reservations regarding its "potential implications for national security and sovereignty". BNP Standing Committee member Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury publicly questioned the interim government's "unclear" stance and perceived secrecy surrounding the humanitarian aid passage, noting initial denials followed by active discussions, including talks in Qatar. He specifically raised concerns about the idea of repatriating Rohingya "through the corridor through the Arakan Army," emphasizing the Rohingya's right to dignified return without conditions imposed by an armed group. This debate reveals how humanitarian efforts in complex conflict zones can become politicized and serve as a proxy for broader geopolitical maneuvering. For Bangladesh, this means navigating a delicate balance where fulfilling its humanitarian obligations risks drawing it deeper into Myanmar's internal power struggles and the strategic competition between global powers. The domestic political backlash underscores the sensitivity of such engagements and the need for extreme caution to avoid unintended consequences that could compromise national interests or stability.
Concerns were also articulated regarding the Arakan Army's alleged support from a "group of Chinese" and who would guarantee any agreement made with the AA, stressing that Bangladesh's stability "cannot be exposed to a power struggle". This reveals a deep-seated apprehension about being drawn into Myanmar's internal conflicts and regional geopolitical rivalries. Bangladesh faces a delicate "balancing act," striving to uphold its humanitarian obligations while simultaneously safeguarding its national security interests.
While there is no evidence of direct military support, Bangladesh has engaged in "unofficial contacts with the Arakan Army". These informal exchanges are described as being "pursued more out of necessity than choice" , reflecting the pragmatic reality of the AA's extensive territorial control. The Myanmar military's retreat has left Bangladesh without a "formal state counterpart" in Rakhine for coordinating critical issues like security, displacement, and border governance. This vacuum compels Bangladesh to interact with the AA, despite its non-state status. The necessity of engaging with the AA, a non-state armed group, due to the Myanmar military's retreat and the AA's consolidation of power, inadvertently confers a degree of legitimacy upon the AA as a de facto governing entity. This normalization of engagement with non-state actors sets a precedent for regional diplomacy in areas where central government authority has eroded. It highlights the profound destabilizing impact of the Myanmar conflict, forcing neighboring countries to adopt unconventional foreign policy approaches that carry inherent risks of entanglement but are deemed essential for managing immediate humanitarian and security challenges. However, these unofficial contacts, while necessary for practical purposes, "still risk drawing Bangladesh into Myanmar's internal conflict". This highlights the inherent dangers and sensitivities of engaging with non-state armed groups that are actively involved in a civil war. Bangladesh's strategic position requires it to balance its relationships with major powers like China and the US, while prioritizing the welfare and security of its own population most affected by the crisis.
The following table summarizes Bangladesh's engagements with key actors in Myanmar regarding Rakhine State:
Table 1: Bangladesh's Engagements with Myanmar Actors on Rakhine State (Official vs. Unofficial)
| Actor Engaged With | Nature of Engagement | Purpose/Focus | Conditions/Caveats | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Myanmar Junta (Naypyidaw) | Direct Diplomatic Contact | Stability, Humanitarian Aid, Rohingya Repatriation | Formal agreement required for UN cross-border aid | |
| Arakan Army (AA) | UN-mediated Contact, Unofficial Contacts | Stability, Humanitarian Aid, Rohingya Repatriation | Via UN for formal engagement; "more out of necessity than choice" for unofficial due to de facto control | |
Assessment of Alleged US Military Support for the Arakan Army
US policy towards Myanmar since the February 2021 military coup has been characterized by a cautious and reactive stance, which some analyses describe as "ineffectual" in achieving its stated goals. The overarching strategic goal of the United States is to "restore Burma's path to inclusive democracy," a condition deemed essential for the country's long-term stability and the advancement of broader US interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
In response to the coup and the junta's ongoing human rights abuses, the US has implemented a robust sanctions regime. These sanctions specifically target the Myanmar military regime, its senior officials, military-linked companies, and key state-owned enterprises, including the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). More recent sanctions have also focused on entities facilitating cyber scams, underscoring a strategic focus on disrupting the junta's revenue streams. Furthermore, the US suspended all trade engagement with Burma under the 2013 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), effective immediately, until a democratically elected government is restored. The US Department of State continues to maintain a "Level 4: Do Not Travel" advisory for Burma, citing armed conflict, civil unrest, and the significant risk of wrongful detentions, among other dangers for travelers.
The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA 2023), which incorporates a modified version of the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act), authorizes the provision of "non-lethal assistance" for resistance groups in Myanmar. The scope of this authorized non-lethal aid is broad, potentially encompassing items such as radios for command and control, ruggedized laptops, GPS systems, satellite phones, body armor, civilian drones and spare parts, and early warning systems against military air strikes. It also covers technical assistance and capacity building for local administrative units and improved coordination among various resistance entities.
Despite this legislative authorization, the implementation of the BURMA Act has been described as "slow-going". The Biden administration has generally "refrained from direct mention of relations with the EAOs and PDFs, choosing to focus more on its engagement with the NUG" (National Unity Government) , and has "largely avoided following through on Congressional mandates". This slow pace has reportedly led to "widespread disappointment in Myanmar" regarding a perceived lack of US support. Furthermore, previous aid cuts, notably by the Trump administration, have severely impacted broader humanitarian efforts, including life-saving assistance for refugees and conflict-affected populations in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The US's risk-averse approach, while intended to prevent direct entanglement or escalation with China, has inadvertently created a strategic vacuum that Beijing is actively filling. China's "dual-track diplomacy" , engaging with both the junta and ethnic armed groups, allows it to maintain significant leverage and protect its economic interests regardless of the conflict's outcome. This suggests that the US's current strategy may be counterproductive to its stated long-term goals of promoting democracy and counterbalancing Chinese influence, as it cedes the role of primary external power broker to China, potentially prolonging the conflict and making a democratic transition more difficult.
Reports, primarily circulating in South Asia, have alleged that the United States and its allies are preparing to launch a "proxy war" in Myanmar. These claims ostensibly aim to destroy the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's armed forces) and deny China access to the Indian Ocean. These narratives include highly specific allegations, such as US officials reportedly traveling to Bangladesh to plan operations with the Bangladeshi government, the establishment of a "massive supply dump" in Bangladesh to support military operations by insurgent groups including the Arakan Army and Chin National Front, and claims that at least three divisions of the Bangladesh Army were preparing to provide logistics and tactical support to anti-junta forces. Further allegations include US assistance in building a "massive facility" near Cox's Bazar for launching Turkish drones against the Tatmadaw, consideration of a "Bosnia-type no-fly zone" over Rakhine with a US aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal, and reports of US naval vessels conducting "coast-kissing operations" to secretly supply arms and ammunition to Myanmar's opposition. Mentions of "Western intelligence agencies fuelling an armed rebellion" and "thousands" of British and American mercenaries secretly entering Myanmar to train ethnic insurgents have also surfaced.
However, these claims are categorically dismissed by observers for several critical reasons. Fundamentally, none of the claims are supported by concrete evidence or direct confirmation from key actors. From an objective standpoint, these stories are considered to "simply defy belief" and are "nothing short of incredible". The likelihood of any Western country engaging in direct military intervention or a proxy war in Myanmar is deemed "vanishingly small," as no strategic imperative would outweigh the significant military and political risks involved. While foreign countries and international organizations provide humanitarian assistance, they are unlikely to provide "lethal" aid, and any such clandestine attempts would likely be quickly exposed. Any mercenaries operating in Myanmar are almost certainly acting on their own initiative, not as agents of a foreign power, and their impact has been minimal. The prevalence of such elaborate, yet unsubstantiated, "proxy war" narratives indicates a sophisticated and active information warfare landscape surrounding the Myanmar conflict. This suggests deliberate efforts by certain actors, potentially the junta or other geopolitical rivals, to spread disinformation, aiming to discredit US intentions, sow distrust among resistance groups, or influence regional perceptions. This environment of pervasive disinformation complicates the ability of international actors to formulate and implement effective policies, as it necessitates constant efforts to counter false narratives and can erode public and political will for genuine engagement, even for humanitarian purposes. Myanmar has a known "reputation for attracting bizarre claims of shadowy deals and secret operations" due to a lack of verifiable information, which creates a fertile ground for misinformation and disinformation.
The following table outlines the US non-lethal aid provisions and their implementation challenges:
Table 2: US Non-Lethal Aid Provisions and Implementation Challenges
| Authorized Non-Lethal Aid Types (Examples) | Authorized Recipient Groups | Implementation Status | Key Challenges/Limitations | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Radios for command/control, rugged laptops, GPS, satellite phones, body armor, civilian drones/parts, early warning systems, technical assistance, capacity building | Resistance groups, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), People's Defense Forces (PDFs), pro-democracy movement organizations | Slow-going; administration has largely avoided full implementation | Funding issues (authorization vs. appropriation), impact of previous aid cuts, perceived lack of support, risk aversion | |
Current US Government and CIA Involvement in Myanmar Affairs
The core strategic objective of the United States in Myanmar is to facilitate the "restoration of Burma's path to inclusive democracy," a goal considered vital for the country's long-term stability and the advancement of broader US interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The US pursues this objective through "positive engagement with the people of Burma" , emphasizing "soft power" initiatives such as educational opportunities for Myanmar youth. The aim is to cultivate future policymakers who can support democratic transitions within their country.
Diplomatically, the US actively encourages efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pressure the junta to de-escalate violence and engage in dialogue with opposition actors. A significant strategic consideration for the US is to "counterbalance China's expanding footprint in Southeast Asia". However, a less proactive US approach has been observed to have "encouraged greater Chinese involvement in Myanmar, not less". The US has formally determined that members of Burma's military have committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, underscoring the human rights dimension of its policy.
CIA activities in Myanmar (historically Burma) have a long and documented history, dating back to World War II with Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operations against the Japanese occupation and continuing through the Cold War. During the Cold War, US intelligence was concerned about communist influence and engaged in operations such as supporting Chinese nationalist general Li Mi's forces in northern Myanmar. Declassified documents reveal the CIA's historical mandate for "covert operations" including "assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations". Myanmar has historically been a significant target of foreign intelligence interest, leading to pervasive surveillance of foreigners by Myanmar's counterintelligence agencies due to suspicions of external interference and clandestine support for opposition elements. This historical precedent of US covert operations in Myanmar significantly complicates current US diplomatic efforts and its stated policy of promoting democracy and human rights. Past actions, even if decades old, lend a veneer of plausibility to contemporary unverified claims, making it challenging for the US to credibly deny involvement. This "shadow of the past" can undermine trust, feed into anti-Western narratives, and create obstacles for legitimate humanitarian and development initiatives, as US intentions are often viewed through a lens of historical suspicion and perceived hidden agendas.
More recently, reports from 2010 and 2011, based on leaked documents, indicate the presence of an electronic surveillance facility at the US Embassy in Yangon, jointly operated by the CIA and NSA (Special Collection Service). Additionally, leaked diplomatic cables from 2011 suggested US funding for civil society groups in Myanmar that played a role in the suspension of the controversial Chinese Myitsone Dam project.
Based on the provided research, there is no direct evidence of current, overt CIA operational involvement or direct military support to specific resistance groups, including the Arakan Army, in Myanmar post-2021 coup. A historical document from 1962 explicitly states that "The Central Intelligence Agency is not engaged in operational activities either in Burma or in Thailand which encourage or support Shan insurgency in any way". While dated, this reflects an official stance on direct operational support to insurgencies. Claims of "Western intelligence agencies fuelling an armed rebellion" are mentioned in the context of the dismissed "proxy war" allegations and are not substantiated by hard evidence. Current US policy, as articulated, emphasizes "non-lethal assistance" and "soft power" engagement , rather than direct military intervention or covert operational support to armed groups. The vigilance of Myanmar's counterintelligence efforts against foreign intelligence activities suggests that any significant direct operational involvement would be high-risk and difficult to conceal. The US's reluctance to engage more proactively or directly in Myanmar's internal conflict, while aiming to prevent escalation or a proxy war with China, has inadvertently created a strategic vacuum that Beijing is effectively filling. China's pragmatic and multi-faceted engagement allows it to maintain significant leverage over all major actors, securing its economic and strategic interests regardless of the conflict's outcome. This suggests that the US's current strategy, by prioritizing risk avoidance, may be inadvertently undermining its own long-term goals of promoting democracy and counterbalancing Chinese influence, allowing China to solidify its position as the dominant external power broker in a strategically vital region.
The following table summarizes the various modalities of US engagement in Myanmar:
Table 3: US Engagement Modalities in Myanmar (Diplomatic, Sanctions, Aid, Intelligence)
| Modality of Engagement | Specific Actions/Tools/Programs | Primary Goals/Purpose | Current Status/Challenges | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Diplomatic Engagement | Encouraging ASEAN efforts, promoting democracy, suspending trade (TIFA) | Restore democracy, human rights, counter Chinese influence | Cautious, reactive, ineffectual, historical legacy of suspicion | |
| Sanctions | Imposing sanctions on junta/military-linked entities (MOGE, cyber scam facilitators) | Disrupt junta's finances, promote accountability | Ongoing, but impact on junta's overall control debated | |
| Humanitarian/Development Aid | Providing humanitarian aid, educational opportunities (USAID, scholarships) | Alleviate suffering, cultivate future democratic leaders | Aid cuts, slow implementation of authorized programs | |
| Non-Lethal Assistance (BURMA Act) | Authorizing non-lethal aid (radios, drones, body armor, etc.) | Support resistance groups, strengthen federalism | Slow implementation, funding issues, perceived lack of support | |
| Intelligence Activities | Historical covert operations, current surveillance facilities, funding civil society groups (historical) | Intelligence gathering, influence events, counter communist influence (historical) | Historical legacy of suspicion, no current direct operational support to AA evident | |
Geopolitical Implications and Regional Dynamics
Rakhine State has emerged as a critical "focal point of geopolitical contention," attracting the strategic interests of China, the United States, and India. Both China and India are actively vying for influence in this strategically significant region. This intense strategic competition risks transforming Rakhine State into a proxy arena, where the local conflict is exacerbated and prolonged by external powers pursuing their own economic and security agendas. While this external interest might offer some tactical advantages or resources to local actors like the AA, it fundamentally complicates efforts to achieve a genuine, lasting peace and a sustainable solution for the Rohingya. The explicit prioritization of geopolitical and economic goals by major powers over the humanitarian crisis means that the suffering of the local population remains a secondary concern, potentially perpetuating cycles of violence, displacement, and instability for the foreseeable future.
China's Interests: China's involvement in Rakhine is deeply intertwined with its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Key investments include the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and a gas pipeline linking Rakhine to China's Yunnan province, which are vital for securing uninterrupted access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Strait of Malacca. China employs a "dual-track diplomacy," officially supporting the junta while simultaneously providing aid and arms to various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) like the AA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). This strategy allows Beijing to maintain leverage over multiple factions and protect its economic and security interests regardless of the shifting power dynamics. Notably, Chinese private security groups are reportedly assisting the junta with drone attacks against the AA near Kyaukphyu , illustrating the complex and sometimes contradictory nature of China's engagement, where it prioritizes its investments over consistent support for any single faction.
India's Interests: India views Rakhine as a crucial strategic gateway for its "Act East Policy," which aims to enhance connectivity with Southeast Asia and counterbalance China's growing influence in the region. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, designed to connect India's landlocked northeastern states to the Bay of Bengal, is a cornerstone of this policy. India is also concerned about the potential for insurgent groups in Myanmar to forge ties with separatist movements in its own northeastern states, exacerbating its internal security challenges. In response to the evolving situation, India has reportedly begun "engaging more directly with the Arakan Army" as part of its broader strategy to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar.
The protracted conflict in Myanmar has significantly destabilized the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, leading to frequent cross-border violence, including gunfire and mortar shelling spilling into Bangladeshi territory, resulting in civilian casualties. Myanmar's internal unrest generates broader "security concerns for bordering nations, threatening regional peace and stability". The collapse of effective governance within Myanmar has created a permissive environment for the proliferation of transnational criminal networks. Human trafficking, cyber scams, and the illicit drug trade are surging, with these criminal activities increasingly spilling over into neighboring countries. Alarmingly, some of these criminal networks, often backed by Chinese organized crime groups, are reported to be funding both the junta and various resistance forces, further complicating the conflict dynamics. The Myanmar conflict is no longer solely driven by political or ethnic grievances; it is increasingly sustained and complicated by a burgeoning illicit economy. This criminal financing creates a perverse incentive for both the military junta and certain resistance groups to prolong the conflict, as it provides a lucrative and self-sustaining revenue stream that bypasses traditional international sanctions or aid channels. This development poses a significant and evolving regional security threat, as the spillover of these criminal activities impacts neighboring countries, potentially drawing them into illicit networks and undermining their own rule of law and stability. It also makes achieving a lasting peace more challenging, as economic interests become deeply entrenched in the conflict's continuation. Regional stakeholders are increasingly recognizing the urgent need for coordinated international responses, emphasizing diplomatic solutions and collaborative efforts, potentially under the auspices of ASEAN or the United Nations, to address the humanitarian crisis and mitigate regional risks.
Conclusion and Outlook
The examination of allegations regarding military support to the Arakan Army and US involvement in Myanmar affairs reveals a complex geopolitical landscape characterized by humanitarian imperatives, strategic competition, and the enduring challenges of state fragility.
Regarding Bangladesh and the AA, the analysis finds no credible evidence of direct military support from Bangladesh to the Arakan Army. Bangladesh's engagement is primarily diplomatic and humanitarian, conducted through official channels with the Myanmar junta and via the UN with the AA. This engagement is driven by the pragmatic necessity of managing the Rohingya refugee crisis and ensuring border stability in the face of the AA's de facto control over Rakhine State. Unofficial contacts with the AA are a reflection of this operational reality, born out of the absence of a formal state counterpart in the region.
Concerning the US and the AA, reports of direct US military support to the Arakan Army are unsubstantiated. US policy towards Myanmar centers on imposing sanctions against the military junta, authorizing non-lethal assistance to broader resistance groups (though implementation has been slow and faced challenges), and promoting democracy and human rights. Widespread claims of a US "proxy war" in Myanmar, including direct military aid to the AA, are dismissed by expert observers as lacking verifiable evidence and defying logical credibility, often stemming from a history of disinformation in the region.
As for US Government and CIA Involvement, beyond established diplomatic engagement, sanctions, and humanitarian assistance, there are no current indications of direct, overt CIA operational involvement or military support for specific resistance groups, including the AA, post-2021 coup. While historical CIA activities in Myanmar are documented and US intelligence maintains an interest in the region, particularly concerning Chinese influence, this does not translate into direct military intervention or covert action in support of the AA in the current conflict. The enduring legacy of historical covert operations, however, continues to shape perceptions and contributes to the plausibility of unsubstantiated claims, complicating current US diplomatic efforts.
The implications for regional stability and international policy are profound. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar, particularly the escalating conflict in Rakhine State and the rise of the Arakan Army as a dominant non-state actor, continues to profoundly destabilize the border regions, posing significant humanitarian and security challenges for neighboring Bangladesh. The increasing autonomy and military strength of the Arakan Army necessitate pragmatic engagement from regional actors and international bodies, even in the absence of a recognized state counterpart, highlighting a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics.
The complex geopolitical competition between China and India in Rakhine adds multiple layers of complexity to the conflict. Both powers are actively pursuing their strategic economic and security interests, often through dual-track diplomacy that engages with various factions. This external involvement can inadvertently prolong the conflict and sometimes prioritizes geopolitical gains over humanitarian concerns, leaving the plight of the local population as a secondary consideration. Furthermore, the alarming emergence of a conflict-fueled shadow economy, driven by transnational criminal networks that reportedly fund both the junta and some resistance forces, creates a perverse incentive for continued conflict and poses a significant, evolving regional security threat that complicates international efforts for peace.
Moving forward, international policy must transcend overly cautious approaches and consider more effective, coordinated, and multi-faceted strategies. These strategies must simultaneously address the dire humanitarian crisis, navigate the complex web of external influences and disinformation, and foster conditions conducive to a sustainable and inclusive peace in Myanmar, recognizing the evolving roles of both state and non-state actors.
