1. Executive Summary
Four years after the military coup of February 1, 2021, Myanmar remains mired in an intractable crisis characterized by escalating violence, a deepening humanitarian catastrophe compounded by natural disasters like the devastating March 2025 earthquake, and a complex geopolitical overlay involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and major global powers including China, Russia, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). The conflict has evolved into a full-blown civil war, pitting the State Administration Council (SAC) junta against a diverse coalition of resistance forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and numerous Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Despite significant territorial gains by resistance forces, particularly in border regions, the junta retains control over core areas and continues its brutal repression, fueled by external support, primarily from Russia and, more pragmatically, China.
The international response has been fractured and largely ineffective. ASEAN, hampered by internal divisions and its foundational principles of non-interference and consensus, has seen its flagship Five-Point Consensus (5PC) fail to gain any meaningful traction, eroding the bloc's centrality and credibility. China pursues a pragmatic, dual-track approach, engaging both the junta and EAOs to protect its extensive economic interests (notably the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor - CMEC) and maintain border stability, occasionally intervening through mediation or pressure related to specific concerns like transnational crime. Russia stands as the junta's most steadfast military and diplomatic supporter, providing advanced weaponry, including critical air power, and shielding the regime from stronger international censure, particularly at the UN Security Council. The US and EU have aligned on condemning the coup and imposing multiple rounds of sanctions against the junta, its affiliates, and revenue streams, while providing substantial humanitarian aid and expressing support for democratic forces. However, the impact of these measures is constrained by the junta's resilience, the lack of universal enforcement, and recent uncertainties surrounding US aid commitments.
This complex interplay of internal conflict dynamics and competing external interests has led to a state of "saturation" – the crisis has overwhelmed existing diplomatic frameworks, resulting in a protracted stalemate. No single actor possesses the capacity or will to impose a resolution, and the fragmented international response lacks the necessary coherence and leverage to compel a change in the junta's behavior or decisively support a transition. The conflict continues to inflict immense suffering on the Myanmar people, fuels illicit economies, and poses growing risks to regional stability. Moving forward requires a significant recalibration of the international approach, shifting focus towards coordinated pressure on the junta, robust and principled humanitarian action bypassing regime obstruction, unified support for an inclusive political process involving all key stakeholders, and a commitment to accountability for atrocities committed.
2. Myanmar Post-Coup: Deepening Crisis and Stalemate
The February 1, 2021, military coup d'état, which overthrew the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), plunged Myanmar into a profound and multifaceted crisis that has only deepened over the subsequent four years.1 The nation is now engulfed in a brutal civil war, marked by widespread violence, immense human suffering, economic collapse, and a complex geopolitical deadlock.
Domestic Situation Overview
Persistent Conflict: The defining characteristic of post-coup Myanmar is the relentless conflict between the military junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), and a diverse array of opposition forces. The SAC, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has consistently resorted to extreme violence and repression to maintain its grip on power.2 This includes indiscriminate airstrikes targeting civilian populations and infrastructure, the razing of entire villages, extrajudicial killings, systematic torture, sexual and gender-based violence, and the arbitrary detention of thousands.2 The junta has repeatedly extended the state of emergency, citing instability it largely perpetuates.2 A particularly egregious tactic has been the enforcement of the 2010 conscription law since February 2024, forcing young men and women into military service, thereby fueling further fear, displacement, and resistance.10 Reports indicate the Myanmar Air Force has dramatically increased its bombing campaigns, dropping more bombs per capita than seen even in the conflict in Ukraine.16
Resistance Dynamics: In response to the coup and the junta's brutality, a powerful resistance movement emerged. This includes the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by ousted lawmakers and activists, which declared a "people's defensive war" in September 2021.4 Its armed wing, the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), comprises numerous local cells engaged in guerrilla warfare and attacks on junta targets across the country.5 Crucially, the post-coup conflict has drawn in many of Myanmar's long-established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).3 While some EAOs remain neutral or prioritize their own interests, several key groups, particularly in border regions (like the Karen, Kachin, Karenni, and Chin), have actively allied with or supported the NUG and PDFs.22 This has led to significant battlefield gains for the resistance, especially since late 2023. Operation 1027, launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (Arakan Army - AA, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army - MNDAA, Ta'ang National Liberation Army - TNLA), resulted in the capture of vast swathes of territory in northern Shan State.3 Similar offensives have seen the junta lose control over most border areas in Kachin, Chin, Karen, and Rakhine states.1 Reports suggest the junta now only fully controls a fraction of the country's territory.32 However, the resistance faces challenges, including achieving unified command structures, overcoming historical mistrust between Bamar-dominated groups like the NUG and some EAOs, and securing adequate resources and weaponry.4
Humanitarian Catastrophe: The conflict has precipitated a humanitarian disaster of staggering proportions. By early 2025, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since the coup had surged past 3.5 million 9, adding to those displaced before 2021. The total number of people requiring humanitarian assistance is estimated at nearly 20 million, over a third of the population.9 Food insecurity is rampant, affecting millions 21, and malnutrition rates, particularly among children, are rising.42 The healthcare system has collapsed in many areas, partly due to the junta's systematic attacks on health facilities and personnel.44 Access for humanitarian aid organizations is severely restricted by the junta, which weaponizes aid delivery, deliberately blocking assistance to opposition-held areas.2 The devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake that struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, compounded this already dire situation, killing thousands, injuring thousands more, destroying infrastructure including hospitals, and displacing hundreds of thousands, further overwhelming response capacities.44
Economic Collapse: The political turmoil and conflict have shattered Myanmar's economy. The national currency, the Kyat, has plummeted in value, driving inflation and making essential goods scarce and unaffordable for many.2 Foreign investment has largely dried up, livelihoods have been destroyed, and the banking system faces severe strain.2
Analysis of "Saturation" and Stalemate
The term "saturation" aptly describes the current state of the Myanmar crisis within the international arena. It reflects a situation where the sheer complexity of the internal conflict, the multitude of domestic and international actors with divergent and often competing interests, and the manifest failure of existing diplomatic frameworks like ASEAN's 5PC have overwhelmed the capacity for effective resolution.1 This saturation has led to a protracted and dynamic stalemate.
The junta, despite significant territorial losses, plummeting troop morale, and internal pressures possibly including corruption scandals 3, has proven resilient. It maintains control over major population centers in the central lowlands 1 and continues to access crucial military and economic resources, significantly aided by external partners like Russia and China.1 This prevents a regime collapse. Simultaneously, the resistance forces, while demonstrating considerable capacity and achieving notable military successes, remain fragmented.4 Challenges persist in establishing a fully unified political and military command, securing sustainable funding and advanced weaponry, and projecting a cohesive alternative governance structure across the entire country.4
International actors, meanwhile, are unable or unwilling to decisively alter this balance. ASEAN is paralyzed by internal divisions and its institutional constraints.1 China and Russia prioritize their own strategic interests, which often align with preserving the junta or managing the conflict rather than resolving it.32 Western powers (US/EU) apply pressure through sanctions and support for democracy but lack the leverage or direct engagement needed for a breakthrough, and face challenges in coordinating their efforts effectively.24 The failure of the international community to compel junta compliance with even basic demands, such as unhindered humanitarian access or adherence to ceasefires (like those declared post-earthquake, which the junta reportedly violated 51), underscores this stalemate.1 The earthquake response itself, while prompting temporary ceasefires from some actors 3, ultimately highlighted the junta's obstructionism and the limitations of international influence.51
This deadlock is not static; frontlines shift, alliances evolve, and external interventions occur tactically (e.g., China's mediation 3). However, the fundamental dynamics preventing a resolution persist. The junta controls core areas and resists pressure 2; the resistance is fragmented despite its gains 4; international efforts lack unity and enforcement 1; and external support fuels the conflict without enabling a decisive outcome for any side.1
The consequence of this protracted stalemate is the deepening of the humanitarian crisis, the further erosion of Myanmar's economy, the entrenchment of illicit economies (including narcotics, human trafficking, and scam centers) that thrive in ungoverned spaces 2, and an increasing risk of regional destabilization through refugee flows and transnational crime.1 The path back towards inclusive democracy appears increasingly remote under these conditions.
3. ASEAN's Fractured Response: The Failure of the Five-Point Consensus
In the immediate aftermath of the 2021 coup, ASEAN positioned itself as the primary regional body to address the escalating crisis in Myanmar. Convening an emergency leaders' meeting in Jakarta in April 2021, attended by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing himself, the bloc formulated the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) as its roadmap towards a peaceful resolution.1 The 5PC called for: (1) an immediate cessation of violence; (2) constructive dialogue among all parties concerned; (3) appointment of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate mediation; (4) provision of humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre); and (5) a visit by the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar to meet with all stakeholders.13
Implementation Failure
Despite its initial adoption, the 5PC has proven utterly ineffective over the past four years, failing to achieve any of its stated objectives.1 The SAC junta has demonstrated consistent bad faith and outright non-compliance. Violence, far from ceasing, has escalated dramatically, with the junta intensifying attacks on civilians and resistance groups.2 Constructive dialogue has been impossible, as the junta refuses to engage meaningfully with key opposition stakeholders, including the NUG and detained NLD leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi.2 Humanitarian assistance has been systematically obstructed, with the junta weaponizing aid and denying access to areas outside its control.2 ASEAN Special Envoys have faced significant hurdles, including being denied access to key figures necessary for fulfilling their mandate.26 Indeed, the junta effectively repudiated the consensus just days after agreeing to it, stating it would only consider ASEAN's "suggestions" once "stability" (on its terms) was restored.58 ASEAN itself has repeatedly acknowledged the "minimal progress" or "substantially inadequate progress" in the 5PC's implementation.14
ASEAN's Internal Divisions
The failure of the 5PC is inextricably linked to deep-seated divisions within ASEAN itself.1 Member states hold divergent views on how to approach the crisis, reflecting their own political systems, economic interests, and relationships with Myanmar and external powers. A bloc often described as more "activist" or principled, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, has pushed for stronger condemnation of the junta, adherence to the 5PC as an ultimatum, and engagement with the NUG.14 Conversely, other members, including Thailand under its previous government, Cambodia, Laos, and sometimes Vietnam, have historically favored quieter diplomacy, engagement with the junta, or prioritized the principle of non-interference.22 This division was evident early on, for instance, in the split vote among ASEAN members on a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the coup in June 2021.72
These rifts manifest in debates over the 5PC itself. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat in Langkawi in January 2025, the Philippines reiterated the need for a new approach, while Vietnam suggested a comprehensive assessment to potentially include more stakeholders, even hinting at involving EAOs – a striking departure from typical ASEAN positions.1 However, no concrete alternatives were agreed upon, highlighting the policy paralysis.1 Furthermore, actions by individual member states, such as Thailand hosting informal meetings with the junta and like-minded neighbors, have undermined ASEAN's collective stance and its decision to exclude the junta from high-level meetings.72 While Thailand's new government has signaled a return to supporting the 5PC 22, the underlying divisions within the bloc persist.
Mechanisms and Their Limits
ASEAN has employed several mechanisms to address the crisis, but each faces significant limitations:
Special Envoy: The role of the Special Envoy is crucial for mediation, but its effectiveness is hampered by being tied to the annual rotating ASEAN Chairmanship. Each new chair (Brunei 2021, Cambodia 2022, Indonesia 2023, Laos 2024, Malaysia 2025) brings a different approach and must essentially restart engagement efforts.69 Brunei's envoy, Erywan Yusof, took a firm stance on access 26, while Cambodia's Prak Sokhonn engaged more directly with the junta, drawing criticism.58 Laos' Alounkeo Kittikhoun met the junta leader 93, whereas Malaysia's Othman Hashim reportedly declined to meet Min Aung Hlaing during an initial visit but met other officials and resistance groups.93 The lack of a permanent secretariat dedicated to Myanmar further hinders continuity and consistent strategy.69 Calls to institutionalize the envoy role with a longer mandate and dedicated resources have been made but not adopted.69 Recent activities include briefings to the UN Security Council and meetings with SAC and NUG representatives.55
Exclusion Policy: Since late 2021, ASEAN decided to bar SAC political representatives from its Summits and Foreign Ministers' Meetings due to the lack of progress on the 5PC.26 While unprecedented, this policy has been inconsistently applied. Junta officials continue to participate in hundreds of other ASEAN sectoral meetings 86, and some member states maintain bilateral engagement or host informal talks involving the junta.53 Myanmar sent a non-political representative to the January 2024 Foreign Ministers' Retreat 22, but a Foreign Ministry official reportedly attended the October 2024 ASEAN Summits, marking a potential softening or inconsistency.86
Troika Plus: Introduced by Indonesia during its 2024 chairmanship, this mechanism involves the past, present, and future ASEAN chairs (the Troika) potentially augmented by other key states ('Plus').2 It aims to provide continuity and allow a smaller, more agile group to take diplomatic action, bypassing the need for full consensus among all ten members.2 Its long-term effectiveness remains to be seen.
Impact on ASEAN Centrality and Credibility
The Myanmar crisis represents a profound test for ASEAN's credibility, relevance, and the principle of ASEAN Centrality – the idea that ASEAN should be the primary driver of regional diplomacy and architecture.1 The bloc's inability to enforce its own consensus or significantly impact the situation on the ground has severely damaged its reputation.1 ASEAN lacks coercive mechanisms and a diplomatic culture supportive of punitive measures, limiting its toolkit.1 Its reliance on external actors, notably China, to prompt action on issues like transnational crime originating from Myanmar, further undermines claims of centrality.1 Civil society groups and some member states have openly called for ASEAN to abandon the failed 5PC and adopt a more decisive approach.10 The 5PC's failure has also provided a convenient excuse for some external powers to defer meaningful action, waiting for an ASEAN-led solution that has not materialized.58
The core dilemma for ASEAN lies in the tension between its foundational principles of non-interference and consensus-building, and the demands of a crisis characterized by mass atrocities and regional instability.13 These principles, designed to maintain unity among diverse member states, become paralyzing when confronted with a member state actively violating regional norms and its own commitments. The 5PC, requiring cooperation from an unwilling junta, exemplifies this paralysis.2 Without enforcement mechanisms or the political will to bypass consensus, ASEAN struggles to exert meaningful pressure.1 The vacuum created by this inaction is inevitably filled by external powers like China, further diminishing ASEAN's role.1 Consequently, ASEAN risks marginalization in managing major regional security challenges, potentially leading to greater instability and increased great power competition within Southeast Asia.1
4. China's Strategic Balancing Act: Interests, Influence, and Intervention
China's approach to the Myanmar crisis since the 2021 coup has been characterized by pragmatic flexibility, prioritizing its own strategic and economic interests above all else. Beijing maintains a complex dual-engagement strategy, interacting with both the SAC junta and various powerful EAOs, particularly those along their shared border.30 This allows China to hedge its bets, maintain leverage over all key players, and pursue its objectives irrespective of the political dynamics within Myanmar.
Core Interests Driving China's Policy
Several core interests dictate China's actions in Myanmar:
Border Stability and Security: China shares a long and porous border with Myanmar, primarily with Shan and Kachin states, areas often marked by conflict and weak state control.83 Beijing's paramount concern is preventing instability from spilling over into its Yunnan province, which includes managing refugee flows and combating rampant transnational crime originating from Myanmar.1 Illicit activities such as drug trafficking (Myanmar being the world's largest opium producer post-coup 83), human trafficking, and particularly the explosion of online scam centers targeting Chinese citizens, have become major priorities.25 China's frustration with the junta's initial inaction on scam centers, many operated in zones controlled by junta-aligned militias 25, led Beijing to pressure neighboring countries like Thailand 1 and tacitly support the EAO-led Operation 1027, which explicitly targeted these criminal enterprises in the Kokang region.30
Economic Interests (BRI/CMEC): China is Myanmar's largest trading partner and a principal source of foreign investment, historically exceeding $25 billion.32 Central to its economic strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), manifested in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).33 This ambitious project aims to connect China's landlocked Yunnan province to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar, featuring key infrastructure like the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and deep-sea port, extensive oil and gas pipelines (already operational), and proposed railway and road networks (e.g., Muse-Mandalay railway).3 Protecting these multi-billion dollar investments and ensuring access to Myanmar's significant natural resources (rare earths, timber, minerals, energy) are critical objectives.28
Geostrategic Position: Myanmar's location provides China with vital strategic access to the Indian Ocean, offering an alternative energy and trade route that bypasses the potential chokepoint of the Malacca Strait.33 Maintaining significant influence in Naypyitaw allows Beijing to project power westward, secure its energy supply lines, and counter the perceived strategic encirclement by the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.71
Post-Coup Engagement and Mediation Efforts
China initially expressed displeasure with the 2021 coup, as it disrupted a period of warming ties with the NLD government under Aung San Suu Kyi, which had been more amenable to advancing BRI projects.71 However, Beijing quickly adapted, adopting a pragmatic approach focused on safeguarding its interests. It has since increased high-level engagement with the SAC junta, offering political legitimacy and economic lifelines.1 Notable interactions include Foreign Minister Qin Gang's visit in May 2023 and Min Aung Hlaing's first post-coup visit to China in November 2024.71 China has also positioned itself as a key mediator in the conflict, leveraging its influence with both the junta and northern EAOs.30 Following Operation 1027, China brokered ceasefires between the SAC and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, holding talks in Kunming.3 These efforts often involve applying pressure, such as demanding EAOs halt offensives or relinquish control of strategic locations like Lashio.3 While officially supporting ASEAN's role 117, China frequently acts unilaterally or bilaterally, reflecting its dominant influence.75 Beijing also engages with the UN Special Envoy on Myanmar.89
Impact of Conflict on CMEC/BRI Projects
The escalating civil war has severely hampered progress on the CMEC and other BRI projects.6 Instability, security risks, and shifting territorial control have stalled major initiatives. The crucial Muse-Mandalay railway project is currently on hold.105 While agreements related to the Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep-sea port continue to be signed 33, their implementation faces significant challenges, particularly with the Arakan Army consolidating control in Rakhine State.28 The conflict directly threatens infrastructure, increases project costs, and endangers personnel.32 Furthermore, control over border crossings and trade routes, essential for the CMEC, has become a key objective for warring factions, leading to disruptions and fighting centered around these strategic points.105 The table below summarizes the status of key projects:
Table 1: Status of Key China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Projects Post-Coup
Project Name | Stated Investment Value | Location/Region | Post-Coup Status | Key Challenges/Notes | Relevant Snippets |
Kyaukphyu SEZ & Deep-Sea Port | US $1.5 billion (SEZ), US $1.3 billion (Port) | Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State | Ongoing (Agreements signed Dec 2023, Feb 2025), but facing threats | Located in area with increasing Arakan Army (AA) control; potential local opposition; strategic priority for China (Indian Ocean access). | 28 |
Muse-Mandalay Railway | US $8.9 billion | Shan State to Mandalay Region | Stalled/On Hold | Crosses active conflict zones; centerpiece of CMEC land connectivity. | 104 |
China-Myanmar Oil & Gas Pipelines | N/A (Pre-BRI/CMEC, operational) | Rakhine State to Yunnan Province | Operational, but security is a concern | Existing infrastructure requires protection amidst conflict; key strategic asset for China's energy security. | 83 |
Border Economic Cooperation Zones (e.g., Chinshwehaw, Kanpiketi) | US $22.4 million (Kanpiketi) | Shan State, Kachin State | Planning/Ongoing (Kanpiketi) | Dependent on border stability; control contested by EAOs; linked to trade and crime issues. | 104 |
New Yangon City Project | US $1.5 billion | Yangon Region | Planning | Large-scale urban development, likely delayed by political instability. | 104 |
Kyaukphyu Power Plant (LNG/Gas) | US $180 million (Gas) / US $2.5 billion (Mee Lin Gyaing LNG) | Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State / Ayeyarwady Region | Partially Operational/Ongoing (Gas plant faced shutdowns); LNG Approved | Energy projects linked to SEZ and national grid; subject to security risks and operational challenges. | 104 |
The pursuit of these interests leads China to perform a delicate balancing act. Its interventions, such as brokering ceasefires after Operation 1027 or pressuring the junta on scam centers, are primarily tactical responses to immediate threats to border stability or economic assets.3 This approach lacks a comprehensive strategy for resolving the underlying political conflict. By engaging pragmatically with whoever controls territory relevant to its interests – be it the SAC or powerful EAOs – China maintains flexibility but avoids committing fully to either side.32 This is evident in its simultaneous provision of political support to the junta while leveraging ties with EAOs, sometimes even allowing or encouraging EAO actions that weaken the junta when it serves Chinese objectives (like the anti-scam crackdown).30 The stalling of major CMEC projects underscores the limits of China's influence when faced with widespread instability.105
This pragmatic, interest-driven approach inadvertently contributes to the conflict's intractability. Providing lifelines to the junta helps it survive, while engagement with EAOs grants them legitimacy and resources, potentially fueling further conflict rather than fostering resolution. China's focus on narrow concerns like scam centers or specific border stability issues might achieve short-term gains but fails to address the root causes of the crisis. This could ultimately jeopardize its own long-term strategic goals, such as the viability of the CMEC and sustained regional influence, especially given the rising anti-China sentiment reported among some segments of the Myanmar population and resistance groups.71
5. Russia: The Junta's Military and Diplomatic Pillar
In stark contrast to the cautious pragmatism of China or the condemnatory stance of Western nations, Russia has emerged as the Myanmar junta's most unequivocal and crucial international supporter since the 2021 coup.67 This relationship, rooted in long-standing military ties, has deepened significantly as both regimes face increasing international isolation and sanctions.67 Russia was the only major power to acknowledge the Tatmadaw's takeover, and Myanmar reciprocated by becoming one of the few countries globally to endorse Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.70
Military Cooperation: Arms and Training
The cornerstone of the Russia-Myanmar relationship is defense cooperation. Russia is a primary supplier of advanced military hardware to the Tatmadaw, a role that has become even more critical post-coup.67 Moscow provides sophisticated weaponry, most notably combat aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters, Yak-130 ground attack jets, and Mi-35 helicopter gunships, along with transport helicopters.67 These air assets are instrumental in the junta's brutal counter-insurgency campaigns, enabling indiscriminate airstrikes against civilian populations and resistance strongholds.47 A 2023 UN report estimated that Russian entities shipped over $406 million worth of arms and related materials to the Myanmar military since the coup.70 This continued supply occurs despite a significant overall decline in Russia's global arms exports following its invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions, highlighting the strategic value Moscow places on the Myanmar market.125 There are even reports suggesting Russia sought to buy back previously supplied military components from Myanmar due to its own wartime needs, indicating the complex flow of materiel.127 Beyond hardware, Russia provides extensive military training and education, with thousands of Myanmar officers having attended Russian military academies since 2001.67 Recent reports also suggest potential cooperation on drone technology.124
Energy and Nuclear Cooperation
Post-coup, energy cooperation has emerged as another significant pillar of the relationship. Facing energy shortages and seeking alternatives to Western markets, Myanmar has turned to Russia for oil imports, leading to a dramatic spike in shipments from Russia starting in 2023.70 More strategically significant is the burgeoning cooperation in nuclear energy. Myanmar has partnered with Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, to explore hydro, wind, and nuclear power options.70 Since the coup, multiple agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) have been signed, culminating in an intergovernmental agreement in March 2025 for the construction of a Russian-designed small modular reactor (SMR) power plant in Myanmar.70 This project envisions an initial capacity of 110 MW, potentially expandable to 330 MW.129 Rosatom is involved in developing nuclear infrastructure, training personnel, shaping public opinion, and establishing regulatory frameworks for nuclear safety.70 A Nuclear Technology Information Center was opened in Yangon in February 2023.70 While framed as peaceful energy cooperation, these developments have revived long-standing concerns about the junta's potential nuclear weapon ambitions.119
Diplomatic Support and High-Level Engagement
Russia provides invaluable diplomatic protection for the SAC regime, particularly within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).67 Moscow, often alongside China, consistently blocks stronger international action against the junta. Both countries abstained from UNSC Resolution 2669 in December 2022, which demanded an end to violence and the release of political prisoners but stopped short of imposing mandatory sanctions or an arms embargo.134 Russia has vetoed previous, stronger draft resolutions on Myanmar 134 and maintains that the situation in Myanmar does not constitute a threat to international peace and security, framing Western pressure as illegitimate interference.75
This diplomatic alignment is reinforced by frequent high-level contacts. Min Aung Hlaing has made multiple trips to Russia since the coup, meeting with President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and former Defence Minister Shoigu.56 Russian dignitaries, including Deputy Defence Minister Alexander Fomin (who attended the junta's Armed Forces Day parade shortly after the coup) and Foreign Minister Lavrov, have also visited Naypyitaw.70 These visits serve to solidify the partnership, broker deals, and provide the isolated junta chief with a degree of international recognition.70
The deepening relationship between Russia and Myanmar's junta is fundamentally a partnership of pariahs, driven by mutual benefit derived from their shared isolation and anti-Western posture. For Moscow, Myanmar represents a willing buyer for its arms exports, a potential new energy market, a supportive voice on the international stage, and a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia.67 For the SAC, Russia offers the military means (especially air power) essential for its survival against a growing insurgency, diplomatic cover preventing stronger international action, and a veneer of legitimacy through high-level engagement.67 This symbiotic relationship significantly enables the junta's violent repression and obstructs efforts towards peace and accountability. The expansion into nuclear cooperation adds a worrying dimension, raising proliferation risks and further integrating Myanmar into a geopolitical bloc opposed to democratic norms and international law.119
6. United States Policy: Pressure, Principles, and Practicalities
The United States has adopted a policy towards post-coup Myanmar centered on condemning the military takeover, applying targeted pressure on the junta, supporting democratic forces, and addressing the humanitarian crisis, often in coordination with allies and partners. Washington unequivocally denounced the February 2021 coup as a "direct assault on the country's transition to democracy and the rule of law" 19 and has consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of the SAC junta.146 U.S. official statements from President Biden, Secretary of State Blinken, and the State Department have repeatedly called for an immediate end to violence, the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint, unhindered humanitarian access, and a return to an inclusive democratic path.15
Sanctions Regime
A key pillar of U.S. policy has been the imposition of sanctions. Executive Order 14014, issued shortly after the coup in February 2021, provides the authority for these measures.19 Since then, multiple rounds of sanctions have targeted a wide range of individuals and entities deemed responsible for or supportive of the coup and subsequent repression.19 Designated parties include senior military leaders (Min Aung Hlaing, Soe Win), SAC members, military-appointed ministers, adult children and spouses of designated individuals, military-owned conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), arms dealers, jet fuel suppliers crucial for the military's air campaign, and various cronies and companies providing financial or material support to the regime.24 Notably, in June 2023, the U.S. sanctioned two key state-owned banks, Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), for facilitating the regime's access to foreign currency.77 In October 2023, Treasury prohibited U.S. persons from providing financial services to or for the benefit of Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the junta's single largest source of foreign revenue, though stopping short of a full blocking designation as imposed by the EU.77 The U.S. has emphasized coordination with allies like the UK, Canada, EU, and Australia in implementing these sanctions to maximize pressure.24 Business advisories have also been issued to warn companies of the risks associated with operating in certain sectors in Myanmar.154
Support for Democratic Forces and the BURMA Act
The U.S. government states its commitment to supporting the Myanmar people's struggle for democracy.19 This includes diplomatic engagement with the NUG and other pro-democracy movement organizations 39 and providing funding for programs related to democracy promotion, human rights, civil society strengthening, and independent media support.41
The Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act (BURMA Act), passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023, codified and expanded upon these policies.79 Key provisions include: authorizing sanctions against junta officials and entities; calling for enhanced policy coordination and UN action (including a global arms embargo); authorizing appropriations for FY2023-2027 for programs strengthening federalism, supporting democratic institutions, documenting atrocities (including support for the UN's Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar - IIMM), and crucially, providing "technical support and non-lethal assistance" to EAOs, PDFs, and pro-democracy organizations.39
However, the implementation of the BURMA Act has faced criticism.39 Concerns have been raised about the slow pace, insufficient funding levels compared to perceived needs (resistance groups requested $525 million for FY24, while $121 million was allocated, including only $25 million for non-lethal/technical support 114), and an overly narrow interpretation of "non-lethal assistance" by the State Department and USAID.39 Unlike support provided to Ukraine, items like body armor, advanced communication equipment, or drone jammers have reportedly not been provided to Myanmar's resistance forces under this authority.39 This has led to disappointment among resistance groups and accusations that the Act raised false hopes.157 The junta, predictably, condemned the Act as U.S. support for "terrorism".114 While the Act provides discretionary authority for more robust support, the political will and resource allocation remain subjects of debate.79
Humanitarian Assistance and Diplomatic Coordination
The U.S. has historically been a major provider of humanitarian assistance to Myanmar through USAID.46 Post-coup aid has continued, focusing on life-saving assistance for IDPs, refugees, and conflict-affected communities.46 However, significant concerns emerged in early 2025 regarding drastic cuts to USAID funding under the Trump administration.51 Reports indicated suspensions of funding across various sectors (humanitarian, health, education, media support) and a potential $1.1 billion loss in foreign assistance over the term.62 These cuts severely impacted health services along the Thai-Myanmar border, refugee support programs, and independent media outlets.61 The timing coincided with the March 2025 earthquake, where the reduced USAID capacity (staff firings, program closures) significantly hampered the U.S. ability to lead or effectively contribute to the disaster response, despite an initial pledge of $2 million.45 This raised questions about the sustainability and reliability of U.S. aid commitments.45
Diplomatically, the U.S. engages with regional partners, particularly ASEAN, nominally supporting the 5PC while acknowledging its shortcomings.19 Washington coordinates policy actions, especially sanctions, with allies like the EU, UK, Canada, and Australia.24 It participates in multilateral groupings like the Quad, issuing joint statements on regional stability and coordinating responses, such as post-earthquake aid pledges.63 The U.S. also advocates for stronger UN action, including pressing for UNSC measures like an arms embargo.79
U.S. policy toward Myanmar thus represents a complex effort to balance punitive measures against the junta with support for democratic principles and humanitarian relief. Sanctions impose costs but struggle against the junta's diversified revenue streams and illicit economies.77 Support for democratic forces, codified in the BURMA Act, faces implementation hurdles and debates over the appropriate level and type of assistance.39 Humanitarian aid efforts are crucial but vulnerable to political shifts and funding volatility.45 Diplomacy relies heavily on coordination with allies and a divided ASEAN.19 This multifaceted approach exerts pressure but has yet to achieve a decisive breakthrough in altering the junta's behavior or resolving the conflict. The inconsistency or potential reduction in support risks undermining both the resistance movement and U.S. influence, potentially ceding ground to other major powers.
7. European Union: Sanctions, Aid, and Values
The European Union's response to the Myanmar crisis has been firmly grounded in its commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, leading to strong condemnation of the military coup and consistent refusal to recognize the SAC junta's legitimacy.24 Brussels has employed a combination of targeted sanctions, substantial humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic engagement, often in coordination with international partners, to pressure the regime and support the Myanmar people.
Comprehensive Sanctions Regime
A central element of the EU's policy is its robust sanctions regime against the Myanmar junta. Since the coup, the EU has implemented multiple rounds of restrictive measures – at least nine by October 2024 24 – targeting individuals and entities responsible for undermining democracy, committing human rights violations, and enabling the regime's violence. As of late 2024/early 2025, these measures encompassed 106 individuals and 22 entities.31 Targets include SAC members, senior military officials, government ministers, military-owned conglomerates (MEHL, MEC), state-owned enterprises, arms suppliers, and cronies facilitating the junta's activities, including those involved in lucrative scam operations based in border areas.24
The sanctions typically involve asset freezes within EU jurisdictions, travel bans for individuals, and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available to those listed.165 Beyond targeted listings, the EU maintains a comprehensive arms embargo, export restrictions on dual-use goods and equipment that could be used for internal repression (like surveillance technology), and a prohibition on military training and cooperation with the Tatmadaw.15 Significantly, the EU took the step of sanctioning the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the junta's primary source of foreign currency, in February 2022 168, a measure the US approached more cautiously initially, opting instead for restrictions on financial services involving MOGE later in 2023.77 The EU emphasizes coordination with partners like the UK, Canada, and the US to maximize the impact of these sanctions.24 However, the effectiveness of sanctions is somewhat mitigated by the lack of universal application, with some countries like Switzerland notably refraining from sanctioning MOGE.168
Substantial Humanitarian Aid
The EU is a leading global humanitarian donor and has significantly scaled up its assistance to Myanmar since the coup.57 Building on decades of support since 1994, total EU humanitarian funding for Myanmar has surpassed €456 million.44 Allocations have increased annually to address the escalating needs; for 2025, the initial allocation of €33 million was increased to over €46 million by April, following the earthquake.44 This includes specific emergency funding released immediately after the March 2025 earthquake (€2.5 million initial, plus €10 million additional, and €500,000 via IFRC).44 EU funding supports a wide range of critical needs, including food assistance, nutrition, clean water and sanitation (WASH), shelter, healthcare, emergency education, and protection services like mine risk education.44 A core principle of EU aid delivery is bypassing the junta authorities; funds are channeled directly through thoroughly vetted international and local humanitarian organizations (over 100 local partners) operating based on humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, ensuring aid reaches vulnerable populations even in hard-to-reach areas.44 The EU is also a major contributor to UN agencies like UNICEF working on the ground.43
Diplomatic Engagement and Values-Based Approach
Diplomatically, the EU appointed a Special Envoy for Myanmar, Igor Driesmans, to facilitate engagement.31 Brussels participates actively in EU-ASEAN forums, such as the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) and Ministerial Meetings, where the Myanmar crisis is a regular agenda item.24 While generally supporting ASEAN's centrality and the 5PC framework as the main regional initiative, EU officials have also publicly acknowledged the consensus's failure and the lack of progress.15 The EU issues joint statements with the US, Quad members, and other like-minded partners condemning the junta's actions and calling for dialogue and humanitarian access.15 The EU's engagement extends to the democratic opposition; the European Parliament formally recognized the NUG and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as legitimate representatives of Myanmar 176, and the NUG maintains representation offices in EU member states like France and the Czech Republic.162 The NUG has publicly welcomed EU sanctions and the appointment of the Special Envoy.171 However, the EU's principled stance sometimes creates friction, as seen in the controversy surrounding the potential participation of junta representatives in the EU-ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue in October 2023, which led to boycotts by civil society organizations.98 The EU also strongly supports international accountability mechanisms, backing efforts at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and prosecute atrocities, including the genocide against the Rohingya.162
Table 2: Comparative Overview of Key US/EU Sanctions Post-Coup
Sanctioning Body | Date Range | Key Individual Targets | Key Entity Targets | Type of Sanction | Stated Objective | Relevant Snippets |
United States (US) | Feb 2021 - Present | SAC members, Military Leaders (Min Aung Hlaing, Soe Win), Ministers, Family Members, Cronies | MEHL, MEC, MFTB, MICB, Arms Dealers, Jet Fuel Suppliers, Specific Companies (e.g., Shwe Byain Phyu, Myanma Five Star Line), Defense Sector Entities | Asset Freeze, Travel Ban, Financial Service Restrictions (incl. re: MOGE), Entity List additions (Commerce Dept.) | Pressure regime, Promote accountability, Disrupt revenue/military supplies, Restore democracy | 19 |
European Union (EU) | Mar 2021 - Present | SAC members, Military Leaders, Ministers, Cronies, Military Commanders (106 individuals as of late 2024) | MEHL, MEC, MOGE (Direct listing), Mining Enterprises (ME1, ME2), Arms Suppliers (e.g., Star Sapphire, Royal Shune Lei), Entities linked to scam operations (e.g., CLM Group) (22 entities as of late 2024) | Asset Freeze, Travel Ban, Arms Embargo, Export Restrictions (Dual-use, Surveillance tech), Ban on Military Training/Cooperation | Condemn coup/repression, Promote accountability, Cut off funds/resources, Support democratic transition | 24 |
The EU's approach demonstrates a relatively unified stance compared to the divisions within ASEAN, driven primarily by its normative commitments. Sanctions and substantial humanitarian aid are its primary levers of influence. While its actions, particularly the earlier and more direct sanctioning of MOGE, sometimes appear more assertive than initial US steps, the EU's overall impact remains constrained by the same geopolitical realities: the junta's intransigence, its backing by Russia and China, and the limitations inherent in coordinating with a fractured ASEAN.15 The EU thus functions as a significant normative and financial actor, maintaining pressure and providing vital relief, but struggling to fundamentally alter the conflict's trajectory in the face of entrenched authoritarianism and competing global interests.
8. Intersecting Interests and Geopolitical Fault Lines
The international response to the Myanmar crisis is deeply fragmented, not only by institutional limitations like those within ASEAN but fundamentally by the competing strategic interests and divergent geopolitical outlooks of the major external powers involved: China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union. Myanmar has become a critical arena where these competing visions clash, overlaying the complex internal conflict dynamics and contributing significantly to the ongoing stalemate and sense of "saturation".8
Competing Visions and Objectives
The primary external actors approach Myanmar with vastly different goals:
China: Beijing's policy is driven by pragmatism and a focus on securing its periphery. Its core objectives are maintaining stability along its border with Myanmar to prevent conflict spillover and refugee influxes; protecting its substantial economic investments, particularly the strategic CMEC/BRI projects providing access to the Indian Ocean; ensuring continued access to Myanmar's natural resources; and consolidating its influence in a key Southeast Asian state while countering U.S. presence.1 To achieve this, China engages with both the SAC junta and relevant EAOs, using mediation, pressure, and economic incentives as tools to manage instability and safeguard its interests.30
Russia: Moscow views Myanmar through the lens of its broader confrontation with the West and its desire to project influence globally. Its primary interests lie in cultivating a reliable ally in Southeast Asia, expanding its arms market (especially important given losses elsewhere), securing potential naval access to the Indian Ocean, providing diplomatic support to a fellow internationally isolated regime, and promoting an anti-Western, authoritarian-friendly world order.67 Its policy is almost exclusively focused on bolstering the SAC junta through military supplies and diplomatic protection.67
United States: Washington's approach is framed by its commitment to promoting democracy and human rights, countering authoritarianism, and maintaining regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. Key objectives include the restoration of civilian democratic rule in Myanmar, holding the junta accountable for atrocities, supporting pro-democracy forces (NUG, civil society), alleviating the humanitarian crisis, and checking the influence of strategic rivals China and Russia.19 Its tools include targeted sanctions, diplomatic pressure, humanitarian aid, and authorized support (like the BURMA Act) for non-junta actors.19
European Union: The EU shares many of the US's objectives, driven by a strong normative commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.24 It seeks stability, accountability for abuses, and a return to democratic governance. Its primary instruments are sanctions (sometimes more robust than initial US measures), significant humanitarian assistance delivered through non-regime channels, support for international justice mechanisms, and diplomatic engagement coordinated with partners.15
ASEAN: The regional bloc's official goal is a peaceful resolution facilitated by its 5PC, aimed at maintaining regional stability and asserting ASEAN's central role in managing regional affairs.1 However, its effectiveness is crippled by internal disagreements reflecting member states' own interests, adherence to non-interference, and varying degrees of alignment with or dependence on the major external powers.1
Areas of Convergence and Conflict Among Powers
These divergent interests create clear fault lines:
China-Russia Alignment: Beijing and Moscow find common cause in propping up the SAC junta, opposing Western sanctions and "interference," and challenging the US-led order.67 They coordinate diplomatically, especially at the UNSC, to shield the junta from stronger international measures.75 While potential areas of competition exist (e.g., arms sales, long-term influence), their shared anti-Western stance currently overrides these.67
US-EU Convergence: Washington and Brussels are largely aligned in their condemnation of the junta, support for democratic forces, use of sanctions, and provision of humanitarian aid.15 They coordinate sanctions and diplomatic messaging, often issuing joint statements.15 Both express frustration with ASEAN's lack of progress while rhetorically supporting its centrality.15 Minor differences may exist in the specific timing or scope of sanctions.77
China vs. US/EU Conflict: This represents the core geopolitical tension surrounding Myanmar. China's backing of the junta directly contradicts Western goals of democratic restoration and accountability.71 Western sanctions targeting junta revenue streams (like MOGE or state banks) potentially impact Chinese economic interests or partners.77 Conversely, US/EU support for the NUG and resistance groups is viewed negatively by Beijing.39 Myanmar becomes a proxy arena for the broader US-China strategic competition.52
ASEAN's Position: The bloc is caught between these competing forces. It seeks to maintain its leadership role but is often influenced or bypassed by major powers.1 External actions can either bolster or undermine ASEAN's efforts; for instance, China's unilateral mediation contrasts with US/EU calls for ASEAN-led processes.1 ASEAN members themselves have varying alignments with external powers, further complicating a unified stance.181
Impact on Conflict Trajectory
The involvement of these external powers with competing agendas directly fuels the conflict's protraction and intractability.1 Russia's arms supplies and China's economic and diplomatic backing provide the junta with the means and resilience to continue fighting despite losses.1 Support from the US, EU, and potentially others for resistance groups, while often limited or focused on non-lethal aid, helps sustain their campaign.39 The lack of a unified international front prevents effective pressure on the junta to negotiate or compromise.1 Competing mediation tracks (ASEAN vs. China) can create confusion or allow parties to forum shop.3
This geopolitical overlay transforms Myanmar's internal struggle into a complex international problem where major power rivalries intersect with local conflict dynamics. The divergent interests of China, Russia, the US, and the EU prevent the formation of a cohesive international strategy capable of pushing for a sustainable resolution. ASEAN, caught in this crossfire and hampered by its own limitations, is increasingly unable to play the central mediating role it aspires to. This reality makes finding a peaceful path forward exceptionally challenging, as any potential solution likely requires a degree of consensus or deconfliction among the major external players – a prospect that seems distant in the current global climate. The risk of Myanmar descending further into fragmentation or becoming an overt proxy battleground remains alarmingly high.39
9. Conclusion: Navigating the Impasse - Saturation, Stalemate, and the Path Forward
Four years on from the military coup, Myanmar is caught in a devastating spiral of violence and humanitarian suffering, exacerbated by a fragmented and largely ineffective international response. The crisis has reached a point of geopolitical saturation, where the sheer number of actors with competing interests and the failure of existing diplomatic frameworks have created a dynamic but seemingly unbreakable stalemate.
The international community's efforts have been characterized by a lack of coordination and decisive impact. ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus, the designated regional framework, has demonstrably failed, rendered impotent by the junta's intransigence, the bloc's internal divisions, and its adherence to the principle of non-interference.1 While ASEAN struggles, external powers pursue divergent agendas. China engages pragmatically with all sides, prioritizing border stability and the security of its vast economic investments (CMEC/BRI), intervening tactically through mediation or pressure but stopping short of seeking a comprehensive political solution.32 Russia acts as the junta's primary military and diplomatic enabler, providing crucial weaponry and shielding it from international accountability efforts at the UN Security Council.67 The United States and the European Union, broadly aligned in their goals of restoring democracy and promoting human rights, have deployed targeted sanctions and provided significant humanitarian aid.19 However, the impact of these measures is limited by enforcement challenges, the junta's access to alternative resources, and potential inconsistencies in policy implementation, such as the debated scope of the US BURMA Act and recent volatility in USAID funding.39 The UN, particularly the Security Council, remains largely paralyzed due to the geopolitical divisions embodied by China and Russia's positions.75
This complex geopolitical landscape, layered upon a brutal internal conflict where the junta is weakened but resilient and the resistance is gaining ground but remains fragmented, defines the current stalemate. It is a deadlock sustained by external support flowing to different sides, preventing any decisive outcome while prolonging the suffering of the Myanmar people. The existing international approaches – reliance on the failed 5PC, uncoordinated sanctions, competing mediation efforts, and partisan external support – have proven inadequate.
A recalibration of the international strategy is urgently needed. Continuing to defer to the 5PC framework is untenable. While acknowledging the complexities and the limited influence any single actor may possess, a more coordinated, pragmatic, and principled approach is necessary:
Prioritize Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Access: Given the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe, exacerbated by the March 2025 earthquake, a concerted international effort, led by donors (US, EU, Japan, Australia) and crucially involving neighboring countries (Thailand, China, India, Bangladesh), must focus on ensuring life-saving aid reaches all populations in need, regardless of territorial control. This requires exploring and expanding robust cross-border aid mechanisms and pressuring all parties, especially the junta, to allow safe and unimpeded access.39 Addressing the critical funding shortfalls, potentially worsened by shifts in US policy, is paramount.42
Strengthen and Coordinate Pressure on the Junta: Like-minded nations (US, EU, UK, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea) must enhance coordination and enforcement of targeted sanctions aimed at depriving the junta of revenue (particularly from MOGE and military-linked enterprises) and access to weapons and jet fuel.24 Diplomatic pressure should be exerted on regional states, especially financial hubs like Singapore and transit countries like Thailand, to prevent sanctions evasion.76 Continued advocacy for a global arms embargo at the UNSC remains politically important, even if vetoes are expected.67
Engage Holistically with Resistance and Pro-Democracy Forces: International actors should broaden and deepen engagement with the spectrum of anti-junta forces, including the NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and key EAOs, recognizing their crucial role in Myanmar's future.4 Support should focus on fostering greater unity among these groups and facilitating the development of a shared, inclusive vision for a federal democratic Myanmar that addresses long-standing ethnic grievances and guarantees rights for all, including the Rohingya.4 Provision of technical and non-lethal assistance, as authorized by frameworks like the BURMA Act, should be implemented strategically and transparently, though recognizing the existing challenges and debates surrounding its scope.39
Uphold Accountability: The pursuit of justice for the widespread atrocities committed, including potential genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, must remain a core component of the international response. This involves sustained support for international mechanisms like the ICC, ICJ, and the IIMM, as well as efforts to document abuses and preserve evidence.23
Navigate Great Power Dynamics Pragmatically: Recognizing the significant influence of China and Russia, engagement strategies must be pragmatic. While countering actions that prolong the conflict or undermine international norms, opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing on areas of shared concern (like transnational crime or regional stability) should be explored.74 Actions that might unnecessarily consolidate Sino-Russian support for the junta should be carefully weighed.67
The crisis in Myanmar is not merely a domestic issue but a regional and international challenge with profound geopolitical implications. The current state of saturation and stalemate underscores the failure of piecemeal and competing approaches. Breaking the impasse requires moving beyond exhausted frameworks, fostering greater international unity among those seeking a democratic outcome, applying consistent and coordinated pressure on the junta and its enablers, providing robust support for the Myanmar people's humanitarian needs and democratic aspirations, and pursuing accountability with determination. The path forward is fraught with difficulty, but the cost of continued inaction and fragmentation is unacceptably high for Myanmar and the wider region.
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